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Abstract: Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas
indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform
corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity
experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another variation concerns the
information about the multiplier of donations where we compare the benchmark case
with a commonly known multiplier to a condition where the multiplier is known for
sure only by donators. Questions which we try to answer are: Will indirect reciprocity
induce higher or lower donations?, will donators with the high multiplier “hide behind
the small one?”, how do receivers respond to the different situations?
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11. Introduction
The names of the following fairy tale may be a bit unusual, but they will be consistent
with the notation which will be used throughout the paper: X2 receives a large amount
from Y1 with whom he had so far no contact at all. X2 asks Y1: “Why are you so
generous?” Y1 answers: “Somebody else – X1! – has been nice to me and I wanted to
be thankful.” X2 asks again: “Why didn't you try to reward X1?” Y1 answers: “Oh, I
would have loved to. But this was impossible. You are the only one I can reward.” X2
concludes: “Now I understand. Thanks!”
What may appear like a fairy tale can often be experimentally implemented so that we
can learn whether the behavioral assumptions are realistic or not. Our starting point is
the trust game introduced by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) (henceforth BDM).
Here a donator can give as much as he wants of a monetary endowment to a receiver.
The amount given by the donator is tripled, and then the receiver may return as much
as he wants to the donator. Thus by trust in reciprocity (see Güth and Kliemt, 1994,
for a theoretical discussion) players can achieve an enormous efficiency gain. They
can triple the amount initially made available.
We perform an experiment in which one treatment is a replication of the BDM set-up.
We call this the direct reciprocity treatment. In another treatment we transform the
BDM game so that it allows us to explore what we call indirect reciprocity. In this
indirect reciprocity treatment a group consisting of four persons interact  two
donators and two receivers. Instead of repaying his own donator, as in the direct
reciprocity treatment, receivers can only repay the other donator.
We also investigate the effect of a third treatment which allows for private
information of donators about the factor by which donations are multiplied. In the
BDM study, and in our first two treatments, the factor is 3. In our incomplete
2information treatment the multiplier is either 2 or 4, each with probability one half
and only donators are informed about the value of this multiplier. Thus a donator,
whose donation will be multiplied by the larger factor of 4, may attempt to “hide his
greed” (see Güth, Huck, and Ockenfels, 1996, for experimental evidence) by choosing
a donation which looks like a generous one for a multiplier of 2, if such a cunning
stratagem is feasible. Private information about the multiplier of donations thus allows
us to distinguish between intrinsically motivated donators and those who are only
interested in an image of generosity.5
In the following section our experimental procedure will be explained in more detail.
We then test whether indirect reciprocity induces at least as high donations as direct
reciprocity, whether donators with the large multiplier attempt to hide behind the
small multiplier, and how receivers react in the various treatments. We finally discuss
in the light of these results why receivers reward at all.
2. Experimental design
To prevent any confounding effects a group of four individuals was mentioned in the
instructions for every treatment (see Appendix A), even though effectively it was only
in the indirect reciprocity case that the players were not engaging in two-player
games. Let us denote by Xi for i = 1,2 the two donators and by Yj for j = 1,2 the two
receivers of each group. The distinction between direct and indirect reciprocity is
graphically visualized by Figure II.1.
[Insert Fig II.1 here]
                                                
5 Another interesting treatment might be to let only receivers know by which factor donations are
multiplied. However, we shall not explore that possibility here.
3In Figure II.1 the variable xi with 0 ≤ xi ≤ e is what Xi gives away where e denotes Xi's
endowment, i = 1,2. In all treatments e was equal to 10 “points”, with each point
worth 8 New Israeli Shekels (NIS).6 What Xi receives is 3xi. From this Yi can return
any amount yi with 0 ≤ yi ≤ 3xi. Whereas the receiver of yi is Xi in case of direct
reciprocity, it is Xj with j ≠ i when only indirect reciprocity is possible.
Whereas the multiplier of donations is commonly known in the complete information
treatments, only donators know whether the value of this parameter is 2 or 4 in the
incomplete information treatment. Receivers Yi were told in their instructions for the
incomplete information treatment that half of the donators have the large multiplier of
4 and the other half the smaller one of 2 and that this is commonly known. Thus the
expected multiplier is 3 as in the treatments with complete information as well as in
the original BDM study.
The monetary payoffs Ui of a donator i = 1,2 and Vi of a receiver i = 1,2 are in the
cases of direct reciprocity and complete information
Ui = e - xi + yi
Vi = 3xi - yi
and analogously in the cases of indirect reciprocity for i,j = 1,2, i ≠ j:
Ui = e - xi + yj
Vi = 3xi - yi
In the case of direct reciprocity and incomplete information the factor 3 in the
definition of Vi has to be substituted by 2 or 4, respectively.
                                                
6 At the time of the experiment, 3.5 NIS equaled approximately one US dollar.
4The “classical” solution would assume that players are only interested in their own
monetary payoff: Since receivers Yi act in subgames the structures of which are
effectively dictator games, their optimal decision would be to choose yi = 0 in each
treatment. Anticipating that nothing will be given back, donators Xi will therefore
avoid positive donations and choose xi = 0. Formally, this solution behavior can be
derived by once repeated elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies or as a
subgame perfect equilibrium (assuming only equilibrium behavior would not rule out
positive choices of yi following positive donations xi which are not chosen in some
particular equilibrium).
The complete design is visualized in Figure II.2 showing that we do not want to test
for interaction effects.
[Insert Fig II.2 here]
Further details of the experimental procedure should become evident from the
Instructions (see Appendix A). After a pilot experiment at Uppsala University the
main experiments were performed at the University of Haifa. In our (statistical)
analysis we just use the results of the main experiments although those of the pilot
experiment would have strengthened our conclusions.
In Figure II.3, using the format of Figure II.2, we list the average earnings in NIS, the
time (in minutes needed), and the number of participants for each treatment.
[Insert Fig II.3 here]
53. Experimental results
A first impression of the experimental results can be gained from Table III.1 which,
with treatments visualized as in Figure II.2, lists for all three treatments the averages,
medians, standard deviations, and the numbers of observations both for donations xi
(left column) as well as for amounts returned yi (right column).
[Insert Table III.1 here]
Whereas the interest rate, defined as
r = [(mean y) / (mean x) – 1] · 100,
is negative (-6.62 %) for direct reciprocity, it is higher (+22.87 %) for indirect
reciprocity. This difference of 1 + r = 1.2287 and 1 + r = .9338 is, however, not
significant (p = .4351 with a Mann-Whitney test comparing the different samples of
individual interest rates defined as  ri = [(yi / xi) - 1] · 100 for direct reciprocity and
ri = [(yj / xi) - 1] · 100 for indirect reciprocity.
Although direct reciprocity inspires more donations on average (the difference is
insignificant — z = .807, p = .4197 with a Mann-Whitney test), these investments in
trust in reciprocity are poorly rewarded. For indirect reciprocity such investment
appear like a reasonable investment chance.
In case of incomplete information the interest rate r = -12.06% is again negative as for
direct reciprocity with a commonly known multiplier. Here it is, of course, interesting
to distinguish between pairs with the large multiplier of 4 and those with the small
multiplier of 2 (see Table III.2).
6[Insert Table III.2 here]
The positive difference of donations xi for the small and the large multiplier is not
significant (z = -1.321, p = 0.1864).
We thus can conclude:
• Indirect reciprocity induces only insignificantly smaller donations than direct
reciprocity.
• Donators with the large multiplier do not donate significantly more, i.e. we
observe “hiding of greed” as Güth, Huck, and Ockenfels (1996)7.
• Receivers are more rewarding in the case of indirect reciprocity in the sense that
they pay a positive interest rate r only in case of indirect reciprocity, whereas r is
negative in both direct reciprocity treatments. However, this difference is not
significant.
We find  the last of these results rather surprising. We initially expected higher rates
of return in the direct reciprocity treatment than in the indirect reciprocity treatment.
Instead, there is no clear difference between the treatments. If anything, the difference
goes the opposite way to what we expected!
                                                
7 Note that even if the multiplier µ  is initially known only by the donator, many choices will
unambiguously “signal” its value. For example, for a donation of 7 the receiver gets 14 or 28, and in
either case the value of µ  will be apparant. Nevertheless, the donator can always “hide” by donating
for example 4.
74. On rewarding
If receivers reward positive donations, one may view donations as risky investments.
If such investments do not pay as in case of the direct reciprocity treatments, one may
ask, of course, whether this is due to overly optimistic expectations or to other
motives, e.g. a desire for efficiency. To test this, one would have to elicit the beliefs
of donators in order to find out how much they expect to get back. In a somewhat
similar game, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) elicit beliefs and report some evidence
that first-movers may be motivated by efficiency rather than a hope for monetary
gain. Conceivably, a similar effect could operate in the current design. Since we did
not measure beliefs we do not discuss this further. Instead, we focus on the following
issue: Why do some receivers reward?
Unlike in dictator games, where no reciprocity argument can explain positive
donations8, all our treatments provide a ready justification for positive rewards,
namely that receivers were rewarded before. The hypothesis “positive rewards (xi > 0)
trigger positive reactions (yj ≥  xi) for i = j and ij” would apply to both, direct and
indirect reciprocity. A distinction between direct and indirect reciprocity could be
based on the degree of obligation which a positive donation implies. It seems
reasonable to assume that one feels more obliged to reciprocate directly than
indirectly. After all the direct reciprocity game suggests an implicitly agreed upon
mutual exchange whereas any similar justification for the indirect reciprocity game
appears rather farfetched.
                                                
8 If one excludes indirect reciprocity in the sense that dictators reward receivers since they got their
position for free (from the experimenters).
8In the light of this, our finding that the receivers are most rewarding in the indirect
reciprocity treatment is odd. A call for more research, specifically aimed at revealing
what psychological forces can explain this anomaly, seems warranted. In this
connection, let us note an aspect which might be important to consider when
designing future related experiments. The obligation to reward if one is rewarded
could be strengthened by allowing to observe others’ behavior. The reason would be
that one feels ashamed if one does not properly reward after a favor (see Hoffman et
al., 1994, who claim less rewarding in double blind dictator experiments, and Bolton
and Zwick, 1995, for other results). Our experiments were not double-blind, but
interaction was anonymous. The direct reciprocity results seem to suggest that usually
receivers feel not at all ashamed not to reward properly. Nevertheless one might
perform an experiment where the essential treatment variation concerns how much the
others (in one’s 4 participant-group) learn about the own behavior (Güth, Königstein,
and Nehring, 1999).
One may ask why receivers should feel at all obliged or ashamed in case of
anonymous interaction (without a shadow of the future like it would exist in case of
repeated trust games). Güth and Kliemt (1994) provide an evolutionary justification
only if the receiver’s moral type can be more or less reliably detected. This is ruled
out by anonymity.
It is possible, however, that we do not decide in each instance of life anew whether or
not we trust, e.g. by donating, or reward trust, e.g. by rewarding donators. In other
words: We do not play lots of games but just the game of life. Consequently an
evolutionary argument should not be based on a highly specific instance and its
special information conditions but on the usual situation of human interaction where
knowing others’ moral types is rather likely. In other words: Experimental
participants import their usual attitudes in the laboratory, for instance, a general
obligation to reward trust (in reciprocity).
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Appendix A:
Instructions for Player A in the indirect treatment
(Translated from Hebrew)
Welcome to this experiment in decision-making. In this experiment, you may earn
some money that will be paid to you, privately and in cash, at the end.
The interaction in the experiment will be in groups of four participants, where the
students in each group are called A, A’, B, and B’. You are called Student A. At the
beginning of the experiment both you and student A’ will receive 10 “points”. Students B and
B’ will not receive points.
You are asked to decide whether you want to send any amount of these 10 points to
student B; and if so, how much. We will triple the amount you send and give it to student B;
that is, for every 1 point that you send, student B will receive 3 points. Student A’ will be
asked to decide how much to send to student B’ in a similar way.
Then we will ask student B’ (who received the money from student A’) to decide if
(s)he wants to send to you any amount of the points (s)he received from A’ and if so, how
much. This amount will not be tripled. Student B will be asked if (s)he wants to send money
to student A’ in the same fashion.
This will end the experiment, and the money will be paid to you (for every point you
will have at the end we will pay you NIS 8).
Your ID number: ______________
Number of points you want to send to student B: _________ (Please remember that this
amount should be between 0 and 10 points.)
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Instructions for Player B in the indirect treatment
(Translated from Hebrew)
Welcome to this experiment in decision-making. In this experiment, you may earn
some money that will be paid to you, privately and in cash, at the end.
The interaction in the experiment will be in groups of four participants, where the
students in each group are called A, A’, B, and B’. You are called Student B. At the beginning
of the experiment both student A and student A’ will receive 10 “points”. You and student B’
will not receive points.
Student A will be asked to decide whether to send any amount of these 10 points to
you; and if so, how much. We will triple this amount and give it to you; that is, for every 1
point that student A will send you will receive 3 points. Student A’ will be asked to decide
how much to send to student B’ in a similar way.
Then we will ask you to decide if you want to send any amount of the points to
student A’ (not to A) and if so, how much. This amount will not be tripled. Student B’ will be
asked if (s)he wants to send money to student A in the same fashion.
This will end the experiment, and the money will be paid to you (for every point you
will have at the end we will pay you NIS 8).
Your ID number: ______________
The amount of points sent to you by student A (after we tripled it): __________
Number of points you want to send to student B: _________ (Please remember that this
amount should be between 0 and the amount you received.)
12
Appendix B: Individual decision data
Full information Incomplete information
Direct reciprocity Indirect reciprocity Direct reciprocity
x y x y x All y y (*2) y (*4)
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
5 3 0 0 0 1 1 1
6 3 3 1 0 2 0 0
7 5 0 2 1 2 1 1
8 5 5 2 2 4 4 4
9 5 5 4 3 5 0 0
10 5 7 5 0 5 2 2
11 5 7 5 3 5 3 3
12 5 8 5 5 5 5 5
13 5 6 5 5 5 5 5
14 6 9 5 5 5 5 5
15 6 10 5 10 5 7 7
16 6 3 5 15 5 7 7
17 7 7 7 5 5 10 10
18 7 7 7 7 5 10 10
19 7 9 7 10 5 10 10
20 9 7 8 7 6 0 0
21 9 10 8 8 6 3 3
22 10 0 8 12 7 7 7
23 10 0 9 14 7 7 7
13
24 10 5 10 5 7 14 14
25 10 10 10 10 8 4 4
26 10 10 10 10 8 5 5
27 10 15 10 15 10 0 0
28 10 15 10 30 10 5 5
29 10 9 9
30 10 10 10
31 10 10 10
32 10 10 10
Average 6.04 5.64 5.29 6.5 5.47 4.81 5.44 5.44
Std.dev. 3.28 4.55 3.54 6.71 3.07 4.07 3.75 4.40
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Figure II.1. A graphical illustration of the exchanges with direct and indirect
reciprocity
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Reciprocity
Multiplier information Direct Indirect
Complete
(multiplier commonly known)
Incomplete
(multiplier known only to donators)
Figure II.2. The three treatments
Reciprocity
Multiplier information Direct Indirect
176.48 164.64
≈30 ≈30Complete
28 28
307.24 Average earnings
≈30 Time neededIncomplete
32 Number of
observations
Figure II.3. Average earnings (NIS), time needed (in minutes) and number of
participants in all three treatments.
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Reciprocity
Direct IndirectMultiplier information
x y x y
6.04 6 5.64 7 5.29 5 6.5 5
Complete 3.28 28 4.55 28 3.54 28 6.7 28
5.47 5 4.81 5
Incomplete 3.07 32 4.07 32
Table III.1. Averages, medians (upper line) and standard deviations, numbers of
observations (lower line) for all three treatments, depicted as in Figure II.2
Multiplier
µ = 2 µ = 4
x y x y
Mean Median 5.2 5 4.2 4 5.9 5 5.4 5
Std.dev. # of obs 2.8 16 3.3 16 3.6 16 4.3 16
Table III.2. The results of the incomplete information treatment separately for pairs
with small (2) and large (4) multiplier
